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RECOVERY FOR NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT IMPACT
Battalla v. State
10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E2d 729 (1961)
Carmen Battalla, a nine-year-old girl, was placed alone in a chair
lift at a state operated ski center by a state employee who negligently
failed to secure the chair's safety bar. She was carried to the bottom with
the bar open and became hysterical. A claim was brought against the
state which alleged "severe emotional and neurological disturbances with
residual physical manifestations."' The New York Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the lower courts, 2 overruled Mitchell v. Rochester
Ry.,3 and held that the plaintiff's claim stated a cause of action against
the state.
It seems fairly well established that if the defendant has merely been
negligent, there can be no recovery for mental disturbance if it neither
results from, nor leads to, some kind of bodily injury.4 However, if the
emotional injury is so severe as to result in physical injury, state courts
are split as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover. The trend seems
to be that if the defendant's conduct is negligent and the plaintiff's in-
juries are the direct result of such conduct, there may be recovery even
though the injuries result through fright.5 However, a large number of
jurisdictions have refused to permit recovery unless there has been a
physical impact with the plaintiff's person. Nevertheless, most of these
courts accept even the slightest contact to permit an action.0 If the impact
occurs at the same point of time as the fright, recovery will usually be
allowed whether the ultimate injuries were caused by the concurrence of
the impact and fright or by the fright alone.7 In Ohio the rule is stricter.
Impact is not enough; there must be a contemporaneous physical injury.8
In the majority of jurisdictions the requirement of contact between the
I Battalla v. State, 17 Misc. 2d 548 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
2 With three members dissenting.
3 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
4 Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 103, 117 (1959); II Harper & James, Law of Torts 1031
(1956).
5 Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 103, 110 (1959).
6 Steverman v. Boston Elevated, 205 Mass. 508, 91 N.E. 879 (1910), clothing burnt;
Homans v. Boston Elevated, 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902), plaintiff thrown against
seat in railroad collision; Porter v. Delaware, 73 NJ.L. 405, 63 Atl. 860 (1906), dust in
eye; Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931), bumped car in which
plaintiff was a passenger.
7 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n "Recommendation of Law Revision Commission to
the Legislature Relating to Liability for Injuries Resulting from Fright or Shock," 425
(1936).
8 16 Ohio Jur. 2d, "Damages," 85 (1955). See Davis v. Cleveland, 135 Ohio St. 401,
21 N.E.2d 588 (1939), the court could easily have found impact when a bus door dosed
on the plaintiff, but it held this was not sufficient.
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plaintiff and the defendant is ignored if there is some immediate, visible
physical reaction to the situation caused by the defendant. 9
The jurisdictions which refuse recovery in the absence of impact have
advanced various reasons in support of their position. In Mitchell V.
Rochester Ry. the court said that since recovery is not permitted when
fright is caused by negligence, there can be no recovery for the results of
fright. These results only show the seriousness of the fright. The right of
action must still depend on whether recovery may be had for fright. The
fallacy in this argument is that it is based on the assumption that fright is
alleged as the cause of action, and the physical consequences are claimed
merely in aggravation. In fact, the plaintiff alleges the physical injury as
the ground for recovery. The fright is just a link in the causal connection
between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury. The reason
there is no recovery for "mere" fright is that fright in itself is not considered
a legal injury. However, physical injuries are legal injuries, and the courts
should permit recovery if they are a direct result of defendant's negligence.' 0
It is also said that such injuries are too remote; that they could not
have been foreseen as the result of defendant's act." The test of fore-
seeability should not be used to determine whether a defendant is respon-
sible for the results of his negligent act. Foreseeability is the test used to
determine whether the act was negligent. When the conduct is found to be
negligent, the actor is liable for all damages resulting therefrom in an un-
broken chain of causation'12
A possible explanation for the refusal of some courts to accept physical
injuries as the legal result of the fright may be their inability to see any con-
nection between conduct causing mental disturbance and physical injuries.
Great advances have been made in the field of psychosomatics, and it is now
well established that physical injuries can result from an emotional dis-
turbance.' 3  However, most courts which require impact considered the
problem long before these advances were made.14
9 Conley v. United Drug, 218 Mass. 238, 240,-105 N.E. 975 (1914), plaintiff fainted;
Lowery v. Manhattan Ry., 99 N.Y. 158, 1 N.E. 608 (1885), a third person, frightened
by defendant's negligence, injured the plaintiff in an attempt to escape; Weinberg v. N.Y.
Rapid Transit Corp., 9 N.Y.S.2d 423 (App. Div. 1938), the defendant negligently left
the gates raised while a train was approaching. The plaintiff started to cross, saw the
train, became frightened, and caught her foot; Cohn v. Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791,
148 N.Y.S. 39 (1914), plaintiff fainted; Lewis v. Woodland, 101 Ohio App. 442, 140
N.E.2d 322 (1955), defendant, as a practical joke, placed a rubber lizard on plaintiff's
lap. The plaintiff jumped up and down, causing her to break her back.
10 Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts 265-66 (1926).
11 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., supra note 3; Miller v. Balt. & Ohio S.W.R.R., 78
Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908; Ewing v. Pitt C. & St. L. Ry., 147 Pa. 41, 23 Atl. 340
(1892).
12 Throckmorton, "Damages for Fright," 34 Harv. L. Rev. 260, 270-71 (1921).
13 See Rosch, "Stress--Its Relation with Illness," IlI Traumatic Medicine and
Surgery for Attorneys 323 (1960); Smith, "Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease,"
30 Va. L. Rev. 193, 216 (1944).
14 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n op. cit. supra note 5. Only three states adopted the
rule in this century.
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Another objection is that the resulting damages are too speculative.15
This is not a defect peculiar to injuries resulting from emotion. Despite
the benefits of medical advances over the years there is some uncertainty
as to damages in almost every action for personal injuries. However, this
objection is more properly addressed to the degree of proof to be required
of the plaintiff than to his right of action. When it is shown that the plain-
tiff has suffered injuries, difficulty in assessing damages should not prevent
his right of recovery.
The argument against the rule in the instant case with the most force
is that based on public policy. The other reasons for requiring impact are
little more than "make weight" arguments. Massachusetts bases its hold-
ings on policy alone,' 6 and the New York courts appeared to reject all other
reasons.'17 The argument based on public policy assumes that if the impact
rule were overruled, a flood of litigation would result, and the courts would
be exposed to the danger of fabricated claims. The fear of being "flooded"
with litigation may be unfounded,' 8 and even if true, it is not very com-
pelling. It would seem that it is the duty of the courts to remedy all
wrongs which deserve redress even at the expense of an increase in
litigation.' 9
The danger of fabrication of claims is a very real one, especially in
the populous states.20 There is a chance that a sick plaintiff, coached by
his attorney, will search for a time when he was frightened and with the
help of a partisan expert witness, attribute his present illness to that
fright.2 ' The medical legal problems in the field of internal medicine are
often different from those in any other field of medicine, and there are dif-
ferences of opinion among sincere and honest physicians.2 2 Thus, a dis-
honest litigant may be able to find expert support for his case. It would
then be up to a jury of laymen to choose between them. However, the
ability of the dishonest claimant to deceive a court may be overrated. 2 3
Even assuming that the courts cannot distinguish between valid and in-
15 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., supra note 3; Miller v. Balt. & Ohio, supra note 11.
16 Homans v. Boston Elevated, supra note 6; Spade v. Lynn and B. R. Co., 168
Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
'-7 Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249 (1960); Comstock v. Wilson,
257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931).
18 Annot. 64 A.L.R.2d 103, 112 (1959). "As far as the volume of litigation is re-
flected, it does not seem that courts in those jurisdictions which recognize a right of
action have suffered substantially more flooding than the conservative courts."
'9 Prosser, Law of Torts, 39 (2d ed. 1955).
20 At the time of the instant case all American jurisdictions having a city with a
population in excess of one million had adopted the impact rule with the exception of
California, and California adopted its rule before Los Angeles became a great city. See
McNiece, "Psychic Injury in New York," 24 St. John's Law Rev. 1 at 32 (1949).
21 Bohien and Polikoff, "Liability in New York for the Physical Consequences of
Emotional Disturbance," 32 Col. L. Rev. 409, 416 (1932).
22 Leas, Trauma and Disease, Medical Facts for Legal Truth, 20 (1961).
23 See Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 175; 142 At. 263, 270 (1958) (Dissent).
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valid claims, a requirement of impact is a poor safeguard. The type of
litigant who would make a false claim would probably have no qualms
about lying further to show impact. The only claims which would be weeded
out would be those by honest persons who were frightened but refuse to
perjure themselves.24
The court in the instant case might have distinguished Mitchell had
it so desired. A finding of contact when plaintiff was placed in the chair
or a shaking or rocking of the lift on the way down would have been suf-
ficient. Instead they overruled Mitchell, thereby abolishing the impact re-
quirement in New York. Overruling the impact rule should give a greater
degree of certainty to the New York law because the rule of Mitchell was
riddled with exceptions 2 5
In jurisdictions which require impact there is a possible danger that
once the court finds impact, or its equivalent, it will be used as a substitute
for negligence. The concept of impact fails to distinguish between ex-
periences which would cause serious psychic consequences in a normal per-
son and those which would only affect an unduly sensitive person. The basis
of liability for negligence is behavior which a reasonably prudent man
would recognize as involving an unreasonable danger to others. Since the
standard of care is measured by the reaction to be expected of a normal
person, the distinction should turn on the severity of the emotional invasion
without regard to whether the invasion was physical or mental.2 6 In the
absence of knowledge of the plaintiff's condition or of actions so outrageous
as to border on intentional harm, the defendant should not be held answer-
able for conduct which only endangers one who is exceptionally sensitive 2 7
Allowing recovery without regard to physical contact should prevent any
possible overemphasis of impact at the expense of more basic principles.
It has been suggested that the problem could be solved most justly by
24 De Angelus, "Doctrine of Public Policy as Applied to Injuries Resulting from
Negligence in the Absence of Immediate Physical Injury," 24 Albany L. Rev. 404, 411
(1960).
25 In Ferrara v. Galluchio, supra note 17, defendant-physician, was negligent in
giving X-ray treatments, causing scabs, blisters and peeling skin on plaintiff's shoulder.
The plaintiff was allowed to recover for resulting cancerophobia; In Boyce v. Greeley
Square Hotel, 228 N.Y. 106, 126 N.E. 647 (1920), plaintiff was a guest at defendant's
hotel. Defendant's servant entered plaintiff's room, addressed her in vile, insulting language
and arrested her husband. Plaintiff was allowed to recover for physical pain or illness
resulting from her humiliation; Garrison v. Sun Printing & Publishing Co., 207 N.Y. 1,
100 N.E. 430 (1912), plaintiff allowed to recover for loss of services of his wife due to
her sickness resulting from defendant's publication of libel; Mitran v. Williamson, 197
N.Y.S.2d 689, 21 Misc. 2d 106 (App. Div. 1960), plaintiff allowed to recover for mental
distress resulting from indecent proposals made by the defendant; Pukaluk v. Ins. Co.
of No. Amer., 179 N.Y.S.2d 173 (App. Div. 1958), plaintiff allowed to recover for a
heart attack resulting from fright; Seider v. Reid Ice Cream, 211 N.Y.S. 582 (App. Div.
1925), plaintiff allowed to recover for sickness caused by seeing a cockroach in her food.
26 II Harper & James, Law of Torts 1038039 (1956).
27 Restatement, Torts, § 313, comment b (1934).
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applying general principles of duty and negligence.2S There does not appear
to be a compelling reason for treating injuries caused through mental dis-
turbance differently from other injuries resulting from negligence. Basing
the liability of the defendant on whether the utility of his conduct was out-
weighed by the risk of harm created appears to be more just and much more
logical than a mechanical rule of thumb based upon the concept of impact.
28 1 Harper & James, op. cit. supra note 26.
